solely upon whether the actiou in which the order is entered is equitable or legal in nature. The court itself admits that "the incongruity of taking [appellate] jurisdiction from a stay in a law type and denying jurisdiction in an equity type proceeding springs from the persistence of outmoded procedural differentiations."'9 ALVIN S. SHERMAN
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of her husband as a result of a head-on collision between the autos driven by the defendant and the deceased. The collision occurred as the defendant approached the deceased while the latter's auto was swerving from side to side on the highway. Held, defendant was faced with an emergency situation and the doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. Burdette v. Phillips, 76 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1954) .
Under the prevailing Florida law contributory negligence is a bar to recovery.' However, the doctrine of the last clear chance mitigates the harshness of this common law ruling, by allowing a negligent plaintiff to recover from a negligent defendant, 2 where the latter by exercising little care could prevent or avoid injuring the plaintiff, who by his own negligence has placed himself in a position of peril. 3 The doctrine of last clear chance is an extension of the rule of contributory negligence and is not an exception to it., The contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat recovery if the defendant, by exercising ordinary care, might have avoided the consequences of the injured person's negligence. 5 When a case arises where the facts arc not in dispute and are absolutely conclusive, the application of the doctrine of the last clear chance is for the court to determine.' On the other hand, it is well settled 7 that the question of negligence as the proximate cause of the injury is for jury determination where the minds of reasonable men may differ. 8 The Florida Supreme Court in the case of Ward v. City Fuel Co., 9 established the necessity of the defendant's appreciation of the situation before the last clear chance doctrine could be applied. It is upon the appreciation of the situation that the case under note revolves. The majority looked to, and considered only, the act immediately preceding the impact; namely, the deceased's swerving back into his own lane of traffic. Considered from that point of view an emergency situation was indeed created and the directed verdict justifiable. The majority was in error when the case is considered from the point of view of the dissenting justices. These justices followed the well-established approach to such problems of proximate cause; namely, that legal or proximate cause is always dependant upon all the facts of a particular case. The dissent stated that a jury should decide on these facts; any other conclusion would allow the defendant "to shield himself behind an emergency created by his own negligence."' 1 In directing the verdict the court completely ignored the defendant's duty to the plaintiff's decedent. It is accepted law in this country that if a plaintiff is helpless, then the defendant's duty to the plaintiff begins when he saw, or should have realized, the plaintiff's position of peril.? It follows then that all the facts of the situation should be reviewed by a jury to ascertain if the defendant was or was not negligent in failing to discover the deceased's peril as lie was required to do by law. Witnesses in the defendant's auto testified that they saw the deceased swerving. A jury might have found, after reviewing the entire factual situation that the defendant did breach his duty in not stopping or turning off the highway into a parking lot, which evidence indicated was available and inviting.
The opinion of the court does much to confuse the approach to proximate cause and the application of the doctrine of the last clear chance. This decision departs from the established rule that proximate cause should be considered in the light of all the facts, as opposed to a single event 6. Wright p. 446 (1953) .
11. Wells v. Shepard, 135 Ark. 466, 205 S.W. 806 (1918) .
immediately preceeding an injury, and the court by so doing, usurped the power of the jury to decide in such cases who was or was not at fault. If this decision is followed to any extent, Florida will have the rather dubious honor of being the only state allowing a negligent defendant to shield himself behind an emergency created by his own negligence. 12
FRANx J. GRENE
TORTS-DAMAGES-SURVIVAL STATUTES
The plaintiff, suing under the Wrongful Death Act' for the negligent death of his wife, alleged as damages the loss of his wife's future earnings. The trial judge disallowed this item of damages on the theory that the husband had no legal right to the wife's earnings. The plaintiff then instituted this action, as administrator, under the Florida Survival Statute, 2 attempting to recover for the estate the pecuniary loss through impairment of earning power the deceased could have recovered had she lived. Held, there can be no recovery for prospective damage to the estate under the Florida Survival Statute. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955) .
At common law a person damaged by the negligent death of another could maintain no action against the wrongdoer. 3 In 1846, England passed a remedial statute under which specified beneficiaries could recover from a person whose "wrongful act, neglect, or default" caused the death of another. 4 Most of the so-called wrongful death acts enacted in this country are patterned after the English statute and use similar language in fixing the grounds upon which such damages may be recovered. 5 Predominantly,
